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Fresh Perspectives on East Asia’s Future 
Lessons of East Asia’s Economic Growth 
by David R. Henderson 
M 
any analysts have suggested that Washington’s attempts to bring 
prosperity to poor and semi-poor countries in the Third World and 
former Second World should be based on lessons provided by East 
Asia’s economic success over the last thirty to forty years. That is a sound idea. 
However, contrary to much scholarly and popular opinion in the United States, 
the chief economic lesson of East Asia is not that judicious intervention by wise 
bureaucrats produces high rates of economic growth. Rather, the lesson of East 
Asia’s success is that economic growth is due either to low government 
intervention or to reductions in government intervention. 
Japan 
Early in the 1950s a small consumer-electronics company in Japan 
asked the Japanese government’s permission to buy from Western Electric the 
right to manufacture transistors in Japan. Permission was legally required because 
Japan’s government tightly controlled foreign exchange and the company needed 
U.S. dollars to cany out the transaction. The Ministry of International Trade and 
Industry (MITI) refused, arguing that the technology was not impressive enough 
to justify the expenditure. But the company persisted. Two years later, MITI 
reversed its decision and the company went on to fame and fortune with the 
transistor radio. Its name: Sony. 
In the mid-1950s MITI exhorted the dominant companies in a Japanese 
industry to develop a prototype “people’s” model of its product so that MITI 
could designate the winning firm as the single producer. The companies refused. 
Then, in the 1960s, h4ITI tried to force the industry’s many firms to merge into 
just a few. Again the companies rejected MITI’s wisdom, yet they went on to 
do very well. Their product: autos. 
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Between 1953 and 1971, national income in Japan grew at an annual 
average rate of 9.2 percent,’ and although growth slowed in the 1970s it 
continued to exceed growth in the United States by a substantial margin. Many 
people in the United States and elsewhere believe that Japan’s rapid postwar 
growth was due to the careful and wise economic planning of MIII, whose 
officials knew in which industries Japanese companies should invest. Yet there 
is surprisingly little basis for this belief. MITI is a powerful force in the Japanese 
economy, just as the Department of the Treasury is a powerful force in the 
U.S. economy. But MITI is not nearly as powerful as many people believe. And 
as the Sony and auto examples illustrate, some major Japanese successes 
occurred in spite of, not because of, MITI’s meddling. 
In a 1993 letter to Policy Review, U.S. advocates of industrial policy, 
including Chalmers Johnson, Robert Kuttner, and Clyde V. Prestowitz Jr., 
challenged this account of MITI’s role in the consumer electronics and auto 
industries.* But the striking thing about their challenge is that it admits much 
of the point. They write, “Because officials recognized the transistor’s tremendous 
global potential, they undoubtedly needed some persuading that Sony was the 
right company to exploit such an important industrial opportunity.” In other 
words, they admit that MITI prevented Sony from acquiring the technology. 
They believe that MITI offkials recognized the transistor’s potential, but they 
present no evidence for this. And in admitting that Japan’s auto companies 
straight-armed MITI’s attempt to force mergers, they write, “corporations have 
always been free to offer counter proposals if they felt that the government’s 
ideas were misconceived.” Translation: MITI was not powerful enough to force 
the companies to go along. 
Moreover, the Japanese government has made little or no contribution 
to other Japanese industrial successes. Consider steel. Production of steel ingots 
grew from 7.7 million tons in 1953 to 97 million tons in 1972, a compound 
growth rate of more than 14 percent.3 In the 1970s when executives of U.S. 
steel-making companies claimed that they were being hurt by unfair competition 
from Japanese steel firms, the U.S. Federal Trade Commission decided to 
investigate, It found that the Japanese government had indeed subsidized the 
country’s steel companies. But from 1951 to 1976, the period of highest growth 
in Japanese steel output, the subsidy had averaged a paltry forty-six cents per 
metric ton. 
In the postwar years, Japan’s government did target several industries 
for preferential treatment. The favored industries included agriculture, shipbuild- 
ing, fertilizer, coal, and electric power. Three of these-agriculture, coal, and 
shipbuilding-were chosen not because of their growth potential but because 
1 See Edward Den&on and William Chung, “Economic Growth and Its Sources,” in Asia’s Neu Giant. 
How the Japanese Economy Works, ed. Hugh Patrick and Henry Rosovsky (Washington, DC.: Brcokings 
In&ution, 1976), p, 96. 
2 Alice H. Amsden et al., ‘yapan: No Industrial Kamikaze,” letter to the editor, Policy Reyiau, Summer 
1993, pp. 85-88. 
3 Denison and Chung, “Economic Growth and Its Sources,” p. 77. 
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they had strong political constituencies. Japan’s notorious barriers to rice imports 
are costly to Japanese consumers and make the Japanese economy as a whole 
worse off. Meanwhile, Japan’s government tried to prop up employment in the 
coal industry by requiring the electric power and steel companies to buy 
subsidized domestic coal according to certain quotas. In 1964, the Japanese 
government’s central plan called for annual domestic production of coal to 
remain steady at 50 million tons. By 1973, however, output was down to 22 
million tons. And employment in the coal mines fell from 413,000 in 1952 to 
34,000 in 1972. J apan’s government was able to keep the shipbuilding industry 
large, but only at a tremendous cost: between 1951 and 1972, 
more than 30 percent of the loans made by the Japan Devel- 
opment Bank were to marine transportation companies. Even The Japanese 
after 1955, when Japan’s shipbuilding industry had become the 
worlds largest, subsidies increased.* 
government 
So if central planning by wise government officials was 
has 
not responsible for high growth, what was? The most careful contributed 
study of the factors behind Japan’s growth from the early 1950s little to the 
to the early 1970s was done by Edward Denison and William 
Chung. Their conclusion is that the growth rate in Jaean’s national 
country’s 
income between 1953 and 1971, standardized for the way it is 
industtial 
measured in the United States, averaged 8.8 percent, and five success. 
factors accounted for this growth. Most important were increases 
in capital (which added 2.1 percentage points a year), increases in the labor 
force and improved labor force quality (which added 1.9 percentage points), 
and economies of scale (which added 1.9 percentage points). Advances in 
knowledge and miscellaneous factors added 2.0 points; improved resource 
allocation, resulting mainly from a contraction of the farm sector, added another 
1.0 point5 Of course the question remains, why did capital and labor expand 
so much and why did knowledge advance and get used in production? For 
the answers, one needs to look at economic policy in Japan. 
Start with taxes. Between 1951 and 1970, total national and local taxes 
(excluding social security) fell from 22.4 percent of income to 18.9 percent. As 
high growth and inflation swelled tax receipts in the 1950s and I960s, the 
Japanese government more than offset those factors by increasing deductions 
and reducing rates. That was in contrast to the United States, where the federal 
government had done little to offset so-called bracket creep during those years, 
with the result that total taxes (excluding social security) rose from 23.9 percent 
of GNP in 1954 to 24.8 percent in 1974.6 The late Brookings Institution tax 
economist Joseph Pechman documented increases in individual exemptions for 
Japanese taxpayers in all but three years between 1954 and 1974, eleven 
4 See Philip Trezise and Yukio Suzuki, “Politics, Government, and Economic Growth,” in Asia:? Nm 
Glim, pp. 794-800. 
i Figures sum to 8.9 owing to rounding. 
6 Computed from data in Joseph J. Minarik, “Taxation, A Preface,” in 7be Fortune Encyclopedia of 
Economics, ed. David R. Henderson (New York: Warner Books, 1993), pp. 311-12. 
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reductions in individual tax rates (with only one increase), and six reductions 
in corporate tax rates (and only two increases). Although individual income tax 
rates were highly graduated, reaching 75 percent in 1974, generous deductions 
made rates for the vast majority of Japanese quite low. In 1974, for example, 
the average family in Japan-which earned 2.4 million yen (the equivalent of 
$8,000 in 1974 dollars)-was in a federal tax bracket of only 12 percent, while 
the average American family-which earned $13,000-was in a 22 percent tax 
bracket.’ These low marginal tax rates gave the Japanese people a strong 
incentive to earn income and a strong incentive to invest in their earning power 
by getting education and on-the-job training. 
Another key to Japan’s high capital investment was its high rate of 
saving, which again was aided by tax policy. Since the early 1950s the Japanese 
have been allowed to exempt large amounts of interest income from taxation. 
In the early 1970s for example, interest income from savings deposits, govem- 
ment bonds, and postal savings accounts with a principal value of up to 3 
million yen (about $10,300 in 1974 dollars) was tax-free. Those without qualms 
about lawbreaking could in theory have held one postal account at each of 
20,000 post offtces, thus making all interest income tax-free, because officials 
tolerated multiple accounts. In fact, according to a Hudson Institute study, in 
the 1970s there were twice as many postal savings accounts in Japan as there 
were men, women, and children. Favorable tax treatment of Japanese firms’ 
lump-sum retirement payments to employees also aided investment and growth 
in the capital stock: employees were willing to accept lower wages in return 
for tax-free retirement payments, and companies could invest those funds that 
would otherwise have gone to taxable wages. 
None of this means that a government seeking economic growth should 
favor savings and investment. It means simply that the government should not 
double-tax savings, as Washington does. Someone who earns money, is taxed 
on it, and then consumes it, is taxed once. Someone who earns money, is 
taxed on it, saves or invests it, and then is taxed on the interest or dividends, 
is taxed twice. 
Many other factors have helped Japan’s economic growth. The absence 
of antitrust restrictions on joint research and development promotes the efficient 
use of knowledge by allowing Japanese companies to avoid duplicating each 
other’s research. Also, contrary to much opinion, Japan has progressively become 
a freer trade country since World War II and, by the early 1980s had brought 
its average tariff rate down to 5.4 percent, compared with 4.9 percent for the 
United States and 6.0 percent for the European Community.8 
The evidence presented here supports the conclusion that Japan’s 
economic success is mainly caused by low taxes, a pro-saving tax policy, and 
a relatively free market. The Japanese government has by no means practiced 
’ In 1974, a U.S. family with a taxable income (income after exemptions and dedudions) between $8,000 
and $12,000 was in a 22 percent federal tax bracket. See Joseph A. Pechman, Fe&& Tax Policy, 5th ed. 
(Washington, 11.C.: BI-ookings Institution, 1987). p, 317. 
R Jagdish Bhagwati, Protectionism (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1988), p. 3. 
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laissez-faire, but its policies are more hands-off than those of Europe’s govem- 
ments or even the U.S. government. Yet the view persists that Japanese society’s 
relationship to its government is somehow entirely different and that Japan has 
a different form of capitalism than the United States does. One of the most 
prolific writers who holds this view is Chalmers Johnson. 
But Johnson presents little economic evidence for his view that the 
Japanese bureaucracy is responsible for many of the economy’s successes. He 
does not, for example, show that in 1955 MITI or other government agencies 
made decision X, which then led to success Y. Rather, much of Johnson’s 
evidence consists of quotations from Japanese government officials who take 
credit for Japanese successes. In his recent essay, “Comparative Capitalism: The 
Japanese Difference,” for example, one of his key pieces of evidence is a 
statement from Hoshino Shinyasu, a former vice minister of the Economic 
Planning Agency, who says that Japan’s economy was “something close to a 
planned economy, not true capitalism.“” Such testimony is not worthless as 
evidence, but it is weak compared with evidence showing, say, that the consumer 
electronics and auto industries prospered in the face of the Japanese government’s 
meddling. 
To make a good economic case one need not be an economist, but 
one must understand basic economic principles. Yet Johnson seems positively 
hostile to some of the key tenets of economics. Take, for example, the tenet 
of mutual gains from exchange. Economics teaches that when two people trade, 
both are better off; if they were not, they would not make the trade. Thus, a 
purchaser is better off giving the grocer his dollar and getting a quart of milk, 
while the grocer is better off giving up the milk in return for the dollar. This 
simple but powerful principle applies not just to trade within a city or a country 
but to all trade, including trade across national borders. It means that when 
Americans use their dollars to buy Toyotas, and Japanese companies use some 
of those dollars to buy wheat and some to buy U.S. real estate, both sides are 
better off. 
Of course, they could make mistakes. Someone could buy a Toyota 
and find that it does not run as well as he expected. Or an alcoholic could 
trade money for another drink, thus losing his health, spouse, and job. If one 
uses a reasonable meaning for the term “better off,” it would be hard to conclude 
that the alcoholic would be better off. Yet those exceptions-not getting what 
you thought you were getting in trade and trading based on addictions-do 
not seern to be particularly relevant to most international or domestic trade. 
Johnson seems to deny that most trade is mutually beneficial. He argues 
that trade “is more commonly about a lot of other things” than mutually beneficial 
exchange, 
such as the exchange of economic advantages for political favors, the open reaping 
of rewards for technological innovation, pay-offs to nations where vital resources are 
9 Chalmers Iohnson, “Comparative Capitalism: The Japanese Difference,” in JULXVZ who Gotmm? (New 
York: W.W. N&on, 19951, p. 57. 
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at stake and might be controlled by a Saddam Hussein or an Ayatollah Khomeini, and 
the creation of surpluses thar can be used to pay for such things as scientific research, 
U.N. peacekeeping forces, and developmental assistance.‘” 
But consider each of Johnson’s four exceptions. One could argue that 
even the exchange of political favors is a form of trade, but grant Johnson his 
point there because many innocent people can be hurt when politicians 
“exchange” something that is not theirs in the first place. The other three alleged 
exceptions, however, are not exceptions at all. 
For example, trade is exactly how people reap the rewards for an 
innovation. They sell the products of that innovation at a price that benefits 
them and clearly benefits their customers. Their customers might want a lower 
price so they can benefit even more. But if the customers did not benefit at all 
by buying at the higher price, they would not buy. 
Take Johnson’s second supposed exception-payoffs. In ordinary par- 
lance, a payoff is a bribe that is paid to someone who is not himself a party 
to a commercial transaction but who threatens to use force to prevent the 
transaction from taking place. Typically payoffs go to people such as mob 
extortionists (who threaten violence to prevent the transaction) and cornlpt 
bureaucrats (who threaten to employ the subtler force of government coercion). 
Thus, when Americans buy oil from Iran or Iraq, it is not to “pay off’ those 
countries in the ordinary meaning of that phrase. Instead, Americans are simply 
buying oil. No doubt they would like the oil at a lower price, but they do gain 
by buying it. 
Of course, there may be long-range drawbacks to enriching those 
countries. One should remember the anecdote about a professor who asks his 
students if they would consider it a good deal to sell him a handgun for a 
million dollars. The students answer: “Yes. No handgun is worth a million.” 
“But,” says the professor, “it wouldn’t be a good deal-because as soon as I 
got the handgun I would have the million dollars as well.” As this anecdote 
illustrates, a world where property rights are not enforced, such as the world 
of sovereign states, operates on different principles than the world of the market. 
Thus, Americans might want to think twice about trading weapons for oil, 
which is implicitly what they do when they buy petroleum from Iran and Iraq 
and those countries use the dollars to purchase amls. 
But that is distinct from Johnson’s charge, which is that oil buyers are 
“paying off’ Baghdad and Tehran. They are not. They are simply buying oil 
from those two countries because Baghdad and Tehran offer them a deal as 
good as or better than that of any other supplier. 
Johnson’s last exception, the creation of surpluses, is insufficiently spelled 
out to be completely clear. If he means that some of the gains people get from 
exchange are taxed by the government and used for governmental purposes, 
he is right. But that does not mean the exchanges that created these surpluses 
in the first place were not mutually beneficial in themselves. 
10 Ibid., p. 53 
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.‘Most examples of trade that is mutually beneficial,” writes Johnson, 
“belong to the category of managed trade.““” Presumably he means managed 
by government, in which case he is simply wrong. And this idea that private, 
voluntary trade does not usually benefit both sides is not an unimportant detail 
but an integral part of Johnson’s case, as he himself seems to recognize. “The 
Japanese,” he writes, “pursue economic activities primarily in order to achieve 
independence from and leverage over potential adversaries rather than to 
achieve consumer utility, private wealth, mutually beneficial exchange, or any 
other objective posited by economic determinists.“” When someone rejects a 
simple economic truth, the rest of his discussion of an economic issue is 
substantially weakened. 
The Four Tigers 
Japan, of course, is not the only example of an East Asian country that 
has had tremendous economic success since World War II. Four others are 
Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan, commonly known as the 
“four tigers” and referred to by development economists as East Asia’s “newly 
~dus~alized countries.” Between 1960 and 1985, the gross national product 
of each of these countries increased at a real rate that averaged more than 8 
percent a year. At the end of the period, the GNP of each was nearly 700 
percent of what it had been at the beginning. By contrast, U.S. real GNP, which 
grew much more slowly during those years, was roughly 217 percent of what 
it was in 1960. 
What is responsible for the four tigers’ high economic growth? Stanford 
economists Jong-11 Kim and Lawrence J, Lau have answered the question in 
pa&l3 Employing the conventional “growth accounting” method that economists 
use to estimate the contribution made to growth by various factors, Kim and 
Lau have shown that increases in capital and labor are responsible for 73 percent 
of Hong Kong’s growth, 91 percent of Taiwan’s, 95 percent of Singapore’s, and 
106 percent of South Korea’s’” (The figure for South Korea means that increases 
in capital and labor were responsible for ail of that country’s growth and 
compensated for a 6 percent decline in growth that resulted from “technical 
regression”-the opposite of technical progress.“) Increases in capital alone 
accounted for 55 percent of Hong Kong’s growth, 77 percent of Singapore’s, 
1’ Ibid., p. 54. 
12 fohnson, “The Foundations of Japan’s Wealth and Power and Why They Baffle the United States,” in 
Japan: who Go~x?r& pp. 105-k 
‘3 See Jong-11 Kim and Lawrence J. Lau. “The Sources of Economic Growth of the East Asian Newly 
In~~~ls~aliz~~d Countries.” ,@un7aE 0~~~~~~~~s~ and rv~~~~~ Economit?i, vol. 8, 1994, pp. 235-71. 
l4 For a hid and reIatir;ely simple ~pla~tion of the growth accounting method, see Edward F. De&on, 
Accoz~~ttn~,~r United States Economic Grozuth, 192$ f!Z64 (Washington, DC.: Brookiigs Institution, 1974). 
I5 Kim and Lau, “The Sources of Emnomi~ Growth,” p. 259, table 7.2. 
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78 percent of Taiwan’s, and 92 percent of South Korea’s Economist Alwyn 
Young has come up with estimates of similar magnitude.‘” 
But that understanding leads to further questions. The dramatic increases 
in labor and especially in capital were not inevitable. What caused so many 
people in these four countries to join the labor force rather than live off their 
spouses, parents, children, or the taxpayers? More important, what caused these 
people to create such quantities of capital-specifically, to save and invest a 
high percentage of their income? And, perhaps most important of all, how were 
the economies of the four tigers able to make such efficient use of the increased 
labor and capital? After all, a powerful government can bring about major 
increases in the work force, savings, and capital investment and can use these 
resources to produce more output. The government of the Soviet Union did 
just that. But without markets to judge which uses of these resources are efficient, 
there is no assurance that the output will be valuable.” 
The point is perhaps best illustrated with the story of shoe production 
in the Soviet Union. Scott Shane, Moscow bureau chief for the Baltimore Sun 
from 1988 to 1991, writes that the Soviet Union was the largest producer of 
shoes in the world, turning out more than 800 million pairs a year. Yet, he 
notes, people often passed up Soviet shoes to spend hours in line to buy 
relatively expensive imports. The reason was that the styles, shapes, and sizes 
of the foreign shoes were more to their liking. The mismatch between consumers’ 
desires and Soviet shoes, he notes, resulted from the absence of a free market 
in shoes. Shoes were produced according to a bureaucratic dictate, not to satisfy 
a perceived consumer demand. Shane writes: 
Indeed, the facrory’s real customer was the state, not the consumer. The state purchased 
all the shoe factory’s production, good, bad, or indifferent. The consumer’s choices 
were not allowed to enter into the matter. So, driven by the tireless efforts of the shoe 
factory hero and those like him, gross national product might rise and the Politburo 
might express satisfaction at the obvious economic progress. But on the street the 
picnlre looked less triumphant: many stores had bins of clunky shoes sitting around 
unbought, while down the street hundreds of people sacrificed their mornings waiting 
for imports.‘x 
Hong Kong 
In the case of Hong Kong, the answers to the three questions above 
are quite clear. For the last half century, the Hong Kong government’s economic 
policy has been closer to laissez-faire than the policy of any other national 
I6 Alwyn Young, “Lessons from the East Asian NICS: A contrarian view,” Eu?q~an Economic hkneu: 
vol. 38, 1994, pp. 9M-73. 
1’ I am indebted to Patrick J, Parker, my colleague at the Naval Postgacluate School in Monterey, for 
emphasizing the importance of this point. 
1s Scott Shane. Dismantling Utopia: How Information Ended the Soviet Union (Chicago, Ill.: Ivan R. Dee, 
1994X p. 78. 
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government in the world. Government consumption is very low-less than 10 
percent of GDP for the last few decades. That enables the colony to keep 
income tax rates low, giving people a strong incentive to work. The top marginal 
tax rate in Hong Kong is 25 percent, one of the lowest top tax rates in the 
world. Extremely low levels of government transfers and subsidies-only about 
1 percent of GDP (compared with an average of about 12 percent in the United 
States during the last twenty years&also give people an incentive to work 
rather than live on transfer payments. Low tax rates likewise give people 
incentives to save and invest, because they know that they will be able to keep 
a large percentage of what they earn by saving and investing. 
Efficient use of this labor and capital in the Hong Kong economy is 
promoted by free trade, which induces people to make those goods for which 
they are low-cost producers. The revenue from tariffs has been less than 1 
percent of the sum of exports and imports, making Hong Kong one of the 
worlds top two free-trade nations. Residents are allowed to own foreign 
currencies and to maintain bank accounts abroad, one of the clearest tests of 
citizens’ monetary freedom. Also, there is no black market in foreign exchange- 
the official price of the Hong Kong dollar in terms of other currencies is the 
same as the actual trading price. l9 Lastly, the government has virtually no 
restrictions on the prices at which exchanges may take place, which means the 
shortages that occur when maximum prices are imposed, and the surpluses 
that occur when minimum prices are imposed, are nonexistent in Hong Kong. 
In sum, Hong Kong’s government has encouraged growth by getting out of 
the way. 
Singapore 
Singapore demonstrates that a country can have economic freedom, 
which causes growth, without much political freedom or respect for civil liberties. 
The Singapore government’s rigid restrictions on the domestic circulation of the 
Wall Street Journal, for example, is one of the most dramatic incursions on its 
citizens’ right to buy and read newspapers. Yet the government has high regard 
for economic freedom. The top marginal tax rate is 30 percent, tariff rates are 
comparable to Hong Kong’s (making Singapore the other of the top two 
free-trade nations), and transfers and subsidies are only about 2 to 3 percent 
of GDP. In addition, people are free to own foreign currency and to hold bank 
accounts abroad; thus, as in Hong Kong, there is no black market premium on 
foreign exchange. 
-But there are two big differences between Hong Kong’s economic 
policy and Singapore’s, and therein lies an interesting tale of two cities. Hong 
Kong’s government has no forced savings program for its residents, nor does 
‘9 For these data, see James Gwanney. Roben Lawson, and Walter Block, Economic Fwdom ofthe Worth, 
1975 1995 (Washington. D.C.: Cato Instihlte, 1996), pp. 154-55, 220. 
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the government try to choose and dictate which industries its residents invest 
in. Singapore’s government, by contrast, uses its Central Provident Fund to 
require citizens to save a large percentage of their income and runs an active 
industrial policy to influence how those savings are invested. The results are a 
dramatic illustration of the damage that government can do by uying to make 
centralized choices about savings and investments. For the last thirty-five years, 
Hong Kong’s and Singapore’s growth rates have been virtually identical. Between 
1980 and 1990, for example, Hong Kong’s real per capita GDP grew by 5.4 
percent a year while Singapore’s grew by 5.2 percent. Superficially, therefore, 
it seems that forced saving and government dictating of investments have had 
no negative impact. But notice that investment in Singapore has averaged about 
40 percent of GDP, while in Hong Kong it has averaged only about 30 percent. 
With such a dramatic difference in investment, Singapore should have had 
substantially higher growth than Hong Kong. Looked at another way: Hong 
Kong was able to achieve the same growth rate as Singapore without government 
intervention in savings and investment, thus allowing its citizens to consume 
an additional 10 percent of income annually. 
The explanation presumably lies more with Singapore’s industrial policy 
than with its forced saving plan. If the country’s people were allowed to invest 
their forced savings as they saw fit, they would probably achieve a higher 
growth of future income than Singapore has achieved. The government’s 
investment choices, then, have curtailed the growth rate. 
That makes sense. As the famed economist Friedrich A. Hayek showed, 
the specific information of time, place, and circumstance that is important for 
good investment decisions exists in pieces in millions of minds.20 No central 
government agency, no matter how brilliant and informed its employees, can 
hold that same amount of information. Consider, for example, “consolidators” 
who buy airline tickets that the airlines cannot sell elsewhere and who then 
resell these tickets to people making last-minute travel plans. These consolidators 
are earning money because they know the situation of the airlines and the 
needs of airline customers’i But no central planning agency would have this 
information and, as a result, seats would go unfilled or would go to people 
who value them less. This is just one of literally millions of examples of the 
efficient use of resources that would be stymied by central government control. 
South Korea 
South Korea’s government has intervened in the country’s economy in 
many ways, but Korea’s slow-growth period in the 1950s was the period of 
the greatest government intervention, while the periods of greatest growth came 
during and just after major reductions in government intervention. 
20 Friedrich A. Hayek, “The Use of Knowledge in Society,” in Indit~dualism andEconomic Otder(Chicago, 
111.: University of Chicago Press, 1948), pp. 77-91. 
21 Joe Brancatelli, “The Travel Magicians: They Turn Seats Into Savings,” I-b-tune, Dec. 9. 1996, pp. 280-81. 
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Consider what has happened in South Korea since the early 1950s. 
Between 1953 (the end of the Korean War> and 1961, growth of real GDP per 
capita was in the low single digits. At the same time, government spending 
grew from 10.9 percent of GDP in 1953 to 22.4 percent in 1961. Indeed, the 
high watermark for government spending as a percent of GDP was reached 
in 1961. After that it declined and fluctuated, averaging 18.0 percent and never 
reaching more than 21.2 percent. Also in the 1950s the government in Seoul, 
led by Syngman Rhee, imposed heavy restrictions on imports, causing Korean 
firms to produce goods that could have been obtained more cheaply abroad. 
At the same time, the government discouraged agricultural production by 
imposing strict price controls on food, with prices below the cost of production. 
Just as price controls on farm products caused disaster in Africa,” these Korean 
price controls hurt growth in an economy where agriculture accounted for 40 
percent of GNP. 
Between 1963 and 1979, South Korea’s GNP per capita grew quite 
rapidly, averaging 7.2 percent annually. Government spending fell from its 1961 
high, averaged 18.6 percent during the 1960s and between 1970 and 1979 
fluctuated in a narrow band between 17 percent and 18 percent. Also, during 
those years Seoul loosened import quotas. Before I967 the government main- 
tained a “positive” list of admissible imports. Only goods on that list could be 
imported without permission; those who wished to import any items not on 
the list had to get explicit government permission. And more than 90 percent 
of imports were subject to quantitative restrictions (import quotas). In 1967 the 
“positive” list was replaced by a “negative” list of products whose importation 
required government approval. That meant automatic approval for imports of 
commodities unless they were explicitly restricted. After I967 just less than 50 
percent of imported items were subject to quotas.‘s 
Thus, low government spending and a liberalization of international 
trade were the main ways the government used deregulation to promote 
economic growth. At the same time, Seoul imposed financial repression, that 
is, put lids on interest rates. That caused shortages of loans, and the government 
then steered loans to the sectors it wished to favor: shipbuilding, the electric 
industry, machinery, steel, chemicals, and non-ferrous metalsi Clearly, the 
Korean government had an active industrial policy. 
What is not clear is that this industrial policy helped growth. Tony 
Michell, a British economist who has written much about South Korea’s 
development, maintains that of the six targeted industries only one, shipbuilding, 
was fully suited to the capital and skills available in South Korea. In the case 
of the electric industry, the government meant for Korean companies to produce 
power-generating equipment as well as consumer electronics, but only the latter 
LL Clive Crook, “A Survey of the Third World,” The Economist, Sept. 23, 1989, pp. 39-44. 
23 See Pyung Jo0 Kim, “Korea’s Financial Evolution, 1961-1986,” in Komun Economic Deudopment, ed. 
Jane K. Kwon (New York: Greenwocxl Press, 1990). 
24 Antonio Car& Stangherlin Rehelo, Economic Growth in South Korea: Govemment or Fr-ee Market 
Achievement? (Monterey, Calif.: Naval Postgraduate School, Master’s thesis, 1995). 
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developed rapidly, again in line with the skills of the country’s workers. The 
machinery industry, according to Michell, was a failure. Steel, contrary to 
predictions based on capital and skills, turned out to be highly efficient. But 
the chemical and non-ferrous industries were disappointments. Aluminum 
produced by the Korean Aluminium Company was heavily subsidized, so that 
the price was 50 percent below production costs. But even these subsidized 
prices were well above the world price, so Seoul forced Korean companies to 
buy one-quarter of their aluminum from the Korean Aluminum Company.Li 
Offsetting the damage done by financial repression was the so-called 
curb market, an informal black market of lenders and borrowers. According to 
economic journalist Mark Clifford, the curb market was more than one-third 
the size of the official loan market.‘” Moreover, as Brandeis University economist 
Peter Petri notes, the large Korean conglomerates that received official loans 
were often able to circumvent the government’s lending objectives. For example, 
one conglomerate that produced both chemicals and garments could receive 
subsidized credit for the former and channel it to the latter. Petri argues that 
this made the allocation of capital in the export sector “almost efficient.“” One 
wonders to what extent the high degree of conglomeration in South Korea’s 
industries occurred because companies needed to find ways around the 
government’s financial repression. 
Since 1979 Korea’s government has pursued a slow but deliberate policy 
of liberalization. For example, it has continued to reduce trade barriers. In 1967, 
51.3 percent of imports were subject to quantitative restrictions; by 1985 the 
figure had dropped to 18.3 percent. And in June 1982 the government ended 
its preferential lending system.18 Then, following Washington’s lead in across- 
the-board cue in tax rates between 1982 and 1984, Seoul brought the bottom 
rate on individual taxes down from 40 percent to 21 percent and the top rate 
down from 70 percent to 55 percent. As in the United States, these cuts led to 
large increases in the amount of income taxed. In 1981, for example, the amount 
of income taxed in the brackets above 65 million won (in 1985 won, about 
$75,000 in 1985 dollars) was 151.4 billion won. By 1984, with the new lower 
tax rates in place, that had increased to a whopping 246.3 billion won.“’ This 
increase in taxable income in the highest brackets suggests both an increased 
incentive to make money and a decreased incentive to avoid taxes by using 
deductions and to evade taxes by hiding income. 
In the end, then, the case of Korea-like the cases of Japan, Hong 
Kong, and Singapore-suggests that the best way the United States government 
15 See Tony Michell. Front a Eweloping to a N&I& Industn’alized Count?: The Kqublic qflcotwa, 19X- 82 
(Geneva: International J&our Office, 1988). 
x See Mark Clifford. Troubled Tiger Bt~+zesmen. Buwaucrats, and Ge?-2erak in South Korea (Annonk, 
N.Y.: M.E. Sharp, 1994). 
2’ See Peter A. Petri, “Korean Trade as Outlier: An Economic Anatomy, ” in Koran Economic Dewlo~~ment. 
Lx See World Rank, World Dewlopment Kqbort 1987 (Washington, 1I.C.: World Hank, 1987). 
29 For these data, see Hyung Son Chang, Supp@Side Economics in theKqubllc SfKorea (Monterey, Calif.: 
Naval Postgraduate School, Master’s thesis, 1990). 
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can help developing countries in Asia and elsewhere is to encourage their 
governments to stay out of the way of economic progress. 
Taiwan 
The story of Taiwan’s economic development is similar to South Korea’s, 
Economists who have studied Taiwan’s economy, such as Ian M.D. Little of 
Great Britain, have concluded that Taiwan’s growth resulted from low levels 
of government intervention or reductions in government interventionjO 
Soon after Chiang Kai-shek took over the island, the govemment 
intervened a great deal in the economy, using fmancial repression-keeping 
interest rates artificially low-so that Taipei could steer credit to politically 
connected firms. The government also owned and operated companies in many 
industries, and imposed high tariffs and quantitative restrictions on a wide variety 
of imports. 
Gradually, though, the government began to liberalize, reducing trade 
barriers and allowing the government-enterprise share of the economy to shrink. 
Between 1956 and 1981. the share of items under import control fell from 46.0 
percent to 3.1 percent, and the ratio of tariff revenue to total imports, a measure 
of the average tariff rate, fell from 27.8 percent to 9.1 percent.” The government 
share of manufacturing production fell from 56 percent in 1952, to 44 percent 
in 1960, to 21 percent in 1970.3’ Economist Robert Wade calls the granting of 
the first plastics factory to the private sector in 1957 “a landmark in this change 
of signals.“j3 Also, firms could borrow from the large and active curb market, 
which offset to some extent the negative effects produced by the government’s 
targeting of credit to less valuable uses. Between 1976 and 1981, while 
government enterprises received 96 percent of their funding from banks, private 
businesses borrowed almost 40 percent of their funds through the curb market. 
Overall, that market supplied 30 percent of the total volume of loans during 
the 1970s. The curb market has become so well established that even today 
Taiwan’s central bank conducts weekly surveys to gauge the curb market’s 
interest rates and then uses that information in setting its monetary policy? 
In a study of thirty-one developing countries (excluding Taiwan), 
Ramgopal Agarwala, a World Bank economist at the time, found a strong inverse 
correlation between the degree of price distortion-through financial repression, 
tariffs and quotas, high minimum wages, and other price controls-and a 
?JJ Ian Little, “An Economic Renaissance,” in Economic Gmwth and Structural Change in Taiwan: The 
Postwar Bperience qf the &public qf China. ed. Walter Galenson (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 
1979). 
Q Robert Wade, Gotwning the Market: Economic 7beoly and the Kale of Government in East Asian 
Indztstriakzation (Princeton, NJ.: Princeton University Press, lm), p, 123. 
9 Ihid., p. 88. 
3’ Ibid. 
++ Ibid., pp. 160-61. 
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country’s economic growth. 35 That makes sense, because prices that differ from 
free-market prices send bad signals. Artificially low interest rates cause credit 
to be granted to those who are politically favored rather than to those who 
value the credit most. Price controls on food discourage the production of food; 
in Africa, price controls on agriculture in the 1960~ and 1970s destroyed some 
major export industries, including Ghana’s cocoa industry.36 High tariffs prompt 
countries to produce goods in which they have no comparative advantage, 
thus making those countries poorer. High minimum wages price less-skilled 
workers out of the market. And so on. 
In a study of several East Asian economies, including Taiwan’s, Wade 
questions the economists’ account of growth, especially in regard to Taiwan. 
He claims that government intervention in Taiwan was much greater than 
economists have said. While Wade agrees that in the 1960s Taiwan’s government 
offset tariffs on imports by subsidizing exports, so as to create no net bias 
against exports, he points out that some import-competing sectors of Taiwan’s 
economy received substantial protection from international competition. But 
that is his only clear refutation of the standard account of Taiwan’s growth. 
More striking is that after presenting a table showing the dramatic decline in 
trade barriers that accelerated in the 1970s he seems to ignore his own evidence 
and downplay the degree to which Taiwan has moved to free trade. Most 
analysts, seeing a table that shows tariff revenue falling from 27.1 percent of 
imports to 9.1 percent, would conclude that Taiwan has moved dramatically 
toward free trade. 
Wade also credits financial repression of interest rates for the high 
savings rate in Taiwan. That the credit institutions are “tightly administered,” 
writes Wade, “makes for rigidity, but also helps to reduce savers’ risks and 
contributes to the extraordinarily high rate of fmancial savings.“37 But he never 
quite explains how keeping interest rates artificially low for lenders as well as 
borrowers would tend to make people want to save and lend more rather than 
less. He also questions whether Taiwan’s government spending is as low as 
economists have said, pointing out that little is spent on transfer payments, 
which means that much of the spending is on direct government purchases. If 
one looks only at direct government purchases as a percentage of GDP, states 
Wade, the percentage of Taiwan’s GDP subject to state control is not much 
different from Great Britain’s, But try telling a taxpayer or a welfare recipient 
that taxes and welfare benefits are not subject to state control. Transfer payments 
are one of the most destructive ways government can hurt an economy, and, 
by avoiding high transfer payments, Taiwan has maintained a strong incentive 
to work and to earn. 
Wade also gives evidence that Taiwan’s government has been very 
intrusive in controlling imports. Import controls, he notes, have made doing 
s5 Ramgopal Agarwaia, “Price Distortions and Growth in Developing Countries,” Staff working paper, no. 
575 (Washington, IX.: World Bank. 1983). 
-% Crook, “A Survey of the Third World,” p. 40. 
37 Wade, Gowning the Market, p. 171. 
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business difhcult for many domestic firms in Taiwan that use imports in their 
production process. One reason that state-owned China Shipbuilding runs at a 
loss, for example, is that the government restricts imports of steel, so the 
company must buy from the state-owned China-Steel Corporation. But nowhere 
does Wade demonsuate, or even try to argue, that these apparently costly 
restrictions are good for Taiwan’s economy. That he does not so argue makes 
sense. Using tariffs and import controls to make productive inputs artificially 
expensive should not be expected to make an economy more efficient. These 
trade barriers lead to domestic production of items such as steel that could 
have been bought abroad for less, hurting downstream producers that use those 
items in their production process, as Wade’s ship-steel example so eloquently 
illustrates. 
In the end, Wade asks to what extent Taiwan’s high economic growth 
is due to “neo-classical growth conditions” (that is, high savings and investment, 
a well-trained labor force, and free markets) and to what extent it is due to the 
government’s selective promotion policies. Interestingly, though Wade’s whole 
book seems geared toward making the case that government planning has 
helped Taiwan substantially, he answers his own question by saying, “Ultimately 
I cannot resolve the issue.“38 Others may find the evidence rather clear. 
China 
China’s government still rules the mainland’s economy with a heavy 
hand. Nevertheless, the country’s extraordinary growth since the late 1970s is 
highly correlated with the degree of the government’s decontrol of the economy. 
One of the first major steps the Chinese government took was to decontrol 
agriculture, a sector that (as recently as 1987) accounted for 31 percent of 
China’s gross domestic product. In 1983 Beijing’s “Central Document No. 1” 
allowed private hiring of labor. In 1984 the regime restored property rights in 
land. Of course, the government did not assign property rights openly and in 
the Western sense. Instead, in 1984 Beijing granted citizens fifteen-year leases 
to land under cultivation, and longer leases for wasteland and other land that 
could be made productive only with a large investment. An old Chinese saying 
is apropos: “Lease a man a desert for a hundred years and he will turn it into 
a garden.” However, economist Yu-Shan Wu argues that the limited time of 
the leases “made peasants reluctant to invest in permanent improvements to 
their land” and “prompted them to engage in predatory farming.“3” The point 
is well taken, but Wu’s implicit comparison is with a system of fully transferable 
property rights, which is not what existed in China. The more relevant comparison 
in trying to account for China’s stellar growth in agricultural output is with the 
.zn Ibid., p. 72. 
39 YwShan Wu, Comparatiw Economic Transfotmations: Mainland China, Hungary, the Soviet Union, 
and Taiwan (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1994>, p. 100. 
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system that preceded the long-term leases. In that system (collective farming), 
there was almost no incentive to care for the land. With collective farms the 
Chinese government had created what Western economists call a “tragedy of 
the commons.” Why take care of the land, let alone improve it, when you must 
split the gains from doing so with hundreds of other people, and with the state 
to boot? Fifteen-year leases, by contrast, could be expected to give much better 
incentives for land preservation, except in the last few years of the leases, which 
unfortunately are the coming years. Even if the leases are likely to be renewed, 
the government could adjust the terms to reflect the value of the land. 
Leaseholders, anticipating such a move, are unlikely to maintain the lands value 
in the one or two years preceding the end of the lease. 
As it granted long-term leases, China’s government continued to require 
farmers to turn over to the government a quota of their output. Above this 
quota, however, farmers were free to sell their output in the open market. In 
essence, therefore, the government imposed a lump-sum tax on farmers with 
a zero marginal tax rate, setting up in agriculture an implicit tax system that 
economists have shown to be the most efficient possible.” The reason is that 
with a lump-sum tax there is no penalty for producing beyond the fmed sum. 
In 1985, the government eliminated compulsory quotas altogether. Unfortunately, 
Beijing did not deregulate completely. Indeed, in 1985, after a record grain 
harvest in 1984, Beijing limited the price it would pay farmers for grain. The 
result: from 1985 to 1988 China failed to meet its production targets as many 
farmers switched out of grain to produce more profitable products. 
China’s government has also created large free-trade zones and has 
reduced tariffs even outside these zones. According to the Hudson Institute’s 
Alan Reynolds, half of China’s industrial output is private, and more than 90 
percent of goods are free from price controls.” 
Can these major deregulations on their own explain China’s double-digit 
growth? If so, why did freer countries in the nineteenth century fail to achieve 
such a rate of growth? The answer is that moving from a totalitarian economic 
system to a free one causes more growth than simply having a free one all 
along. Socialist economic systems create massive waste because they lack price 
signals and incentives that motivate people to produce things others want. 
Decontrolling such systems, especially after years of totalitarian control, can 
bring about an economic renaissance. Similar decontrol in West Germany in 
1948 caused industrial production to rise 50 percent in the six months after 
decontrol and to reach, in just ten years, four times the level of production 
prior to decontrol. For those ten years, therefore, West Germany’s industrial 
production grew at a compound annual rate of 14.8 percent. 
*(I See Joseph Stiglitz, Economics of the Public Sector> 2nd ed. (New York: W.W. Norton, 198%, p. 392. 
41 Alan Reynolds, “National Prosperity Is No Mystery,” Orbis, Spring 19906, pp. 202-3. 
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Conclusion 
This article has focused on the economic policies that Washington 
should encourage in developing countries. It has said nothing about whether 
Washington should encourage democracy. That is because democracy is less 
important to economic growth than economic freedom is. Indeed, as Robert 
Ban-o has shown, democracy appears to have no significant impact on economic 
gOW&P 
But although democracy in no way guarantees economic freedom, 
Ban-o has also shown that economic growth does tend to lead to democracy. 
Thus, Karl Marx seems to have been right when he said that capitalism is the 
mother, not the daughter, of democracy. 
These observations in no way imply that the U.S. government should 
discourage democracy. But they do cast doubt on the goal of promoting democracy 
as a solution to poverty. The best way for Washington to promote economic 
growth and, ultimately, democracy is to encourage other countries’ 
governments to free their economies and, in particular, to abstain from 
putting trade barriers in the way of those countries’ exports. 
42 Robert J. Barre, Getting It Right: Madzets and Choices in a Frze Societv (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 
1996), pp. 1-12. 
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